In this paper we examine the e¤ects of the abolition of the compulsory conscription in France on the demand for education and labour market outcomes. The reform took place in 1997 and a¤ected all men born after 1979. Before the reform, staying on in education was a way to defer the national service and increase the probability of exemption. After the reform, these speci…c incentives to stay on in education have disappeared and the relative cost of education for men has plausibly increased. As a matter of fact, our data reveal that the reform has been followed by a signi…cant decrease in the number of years spent at school by male students, as well as in the proportion of male degree holders. In contrast, the reform had no signi…cant e¤ect on the demand for education for women. We use this exogenous variation in men's relative demand for education to provide IV estimates of the returns to education. These estimates are larger than standard OLS estimates. JEL Classi…cation: J31, J24, I20
Introduction
France abolished compulsory conscription in November 1997. Speci…cally, the 1997 law abolished compulsory conscription for men born in 1979 and after. As a consequence, the last Frenchmen who were subject to compulsory national service were born in 1978. Before 1997, any young Frenchmen was exposed to the risk of being called by the military administration to do a 10 months national service (16 months for speci…c forms of service).
The 1997 reform has reduced the set of alternatives after compulsory education. Also, it has modi…ed the cost of staying on in education compared to the cost of direct entry into the labour market. As explained below, pursuing education was a mean to di¤er the national service, to increase the probability of being exempted and to get access to more interesting forms of the national service. After the reform, these speci…c incentives to stay in education have disappeared and the relative cost of education for men has plausibly increased.
The main purpose of the paper is to test this hypothesis and to analyse the extent to which the reform has actually diminished men's demand for education. Also, our goal is to use the variation in men's demand for education induced by the reform to evaluate the impact of education on earnings at the entry into the labour market. Generally speaking, our method consists in comparing the changes in educational and labour market outcomes for men and women and testing whether the reform has been accompanied by a relative decline in men's outcomes.
To anticipate the rest of the paper, the main …ndings may be summarized as follows:
1. When we compare behaviours before and after the reform by age groups, we observe a signi…cant decline (-4 percent points) in the proportion of men pursuing education at age 18 to 22, but no signi…cant shifts before age 18 nor after age 22. In contrast, we do not observe any signi…cant shifts for women, regardless of their age. These results are consistent with the assumption that the reform has induced an increase in the relative cost of education for men.
A signi…cant fraction of men born in 1979 would have left school later if they were born one or two years before.
2 . When we focus on individuals who leave education at age 22 or before, we …nd that the relative decline in men's relative years of education is accompanied by a relative decline in the proportion of men with at least a vocational degree. Also, the relative decline in men's educational credentials at the entry into the labour market is accompanied by a relative decline in their entry hourly wages.
3. Assuming that the reform a¤ected men's relative entry wages mostly through a¤ecting their relative education, we can use a dummy interacting the sex and the date of birth (before or after the reform) as an instrumental variable to identify the impact of education on earnings.
Our IV estimates are signi…cant at standard level. They are larger than the OLS estimates. The downward bias a¤ecting OLS estimate suggests a negative correlation between men's education and the unobserved determinants of wages. Individuals who enter the labour market with some degree receive wages which are lower than the wages that would have received individuals who enter the labour market without any degree if they had decided to pursue education. 4 . Our data show that the reform mostly a¤ected sons of blue collar workers. When we focus on the group of children whose father is a blue collar worker, we …nd that the reform had a negative and signi…cant impact on both relative education and relative entry wages of men.
In contrast, when we focus on the group of children whose father is a white collar worker, the reform has no impact on men's relative education nor on their relative entry wages. This result con…rms that the national service a¤ected entry wages mostly through a¤ecting educational choices.
5. We provide additional estimates of the causal e¤ect of education using the subsample of men and a dummy interacting the occupation of the father (blue/white collar worker) and the date of birth (after/before reform) as an instrumental variable. The identifying assumption is that the reform a¤ects sons of blue collars' relative wages mostly through a¤ecting their relative education. We obtain the same type of results with this strategy as with the strategy which relies on the impact of the reform on men's relative outcomes: the IV estimates are signi…cant at standard level and larger than the OLS estimates.
The paper is organised as follows. The following section provides an overlook of the literature on the e¤ect of military service. The third section describes the French institutional context and the reform. Section 4 presents the data and provides a description of the changes in the proportion of men doing their military service across cohorts born from 1975 to 1979. Section 5 develops our theoretical framework. The issue is to de…ne the parameters which may be identi…ed by the comparison of the outcomes of men and women, before and after the reform.
The last section provides a statistical and econometric analysis showing the e¤ect of the reform on the relative outcomes for men.
Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature on the impact of the abolition of the national service on the demand for education and labour market outcomes, although several countries have abolished compulsory conscription and passed on a professional army.
The existing literature mostly attempts to estimate the e¤ect of veteran status (either of the Second World War, WWII, or the Vietnam War) on civilian earnings. The implicit assumption is that the possibility of being drafted a¤ects individual outcomes mostly through actual military service. The idea that the draft might have a¤ected earnings via other channels than the veteran status is not new, however. In particular Angrist (1990) says that "it may be that the draft has a¤ected education attainment and other career choices along with its e¤ect on the military service". L. Baskir and W. Strauss (1978) suggest that during the Vietnam War men went to college to avoid the draft. If this is true, then the draft must have a¤ected earnings via this education channel and not only through veteran status. Angrist and Krueger (1994) mention that "there is evidence that during the Vietnam War, college educated men from wealthy families managed to avoid the military service, whereas less educated-low income men were unable to do so. This would introduce a negative bias in the estimates of the returns to veteran status".
In the existing literature there is evidence of positive earnings and employment gains for Word War II veterans, whereas these are negative for the veterans of the war in Vietnam (Angrist 1990 , Angrist 1995 , Angrist 1998 and Angrist and Krueger 1995 . Angrist (1990) uses the introduction of the draft lottery during the Vietnam War as a natural experiment, in order to get a better estimate of the e¤ect of veteran status on earnings, corrected for selectivity. He uses social security data to …rst estimate the e¤ect of draft eligibility on earnings and second to use an IV estimator. He …nds a negative coe¢cient associated with veteran status in an earnings equation of the order of 15%. Angrist and Krueger (1994) exploit the fact that after 1942 men were drafted in chronological order of birth and thus they use quarter of birth as an instrument for veteran status. They do not …nd any earnings premium for WWII veterans with a 2SLS method and conclude that the positive estimates of the WWII veteran premium are due entirely to non random selection into the army. Angrist (1998) makes use of the reductions in the volunteer armed forces, which begun in 1987, and uses matching and regression techniques to reduce the selection bias of the military screening.
It should be emphasized that the impact of Veteran status corresponds to a strong experience which only a¤ects a non random selection of each cohort. In contrast, the national service implies a risk of being called by the army, which is bore by everyone and, above all, which does not imply going through such a critical test as war.
In that sense, the study on Dutch data, by Imbens and Van der Klaauw (1995) is perhaps closer in spirit to our work than existing studies on veteran status. They estimate the e¤ect of military service on earnings. They attempt to deal with the issue of selection into the Dutch military service due to both medical and psychological tests and the way exemptions from the army operate. In particular they talk about the possible link between education and the military service and argue that "another potential source of bias comes from the conditions for deferment or temporary exemptions which a¤ect young men who are still in higher education".
They use variation in aggregate military enrollment rates induced by policy variation to deal with selection. Their results suggest a small negative impact of the army on earnings, which is of the order of 5%, ten years after serving the army. Bauer et al (2003) try to evaluate the impact of military service on labour market outcomes in Germany. They use a change in the law regarding the conscription in Germany (which de…ned a cohort of people who did not have to serve the army) to suggest a discontinuity regression approach to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates of the e¤ect of compulsory military service on wages.
Cipollone and Rosolia (2003) measure the strength of social interaction as determinants of educational choice. They use the event of an earthquake which hit Southern Italy and resulted in the relief from the military service granted to certain cohorts of men in the a¤ected municipalities. Given that women are not directly a¤ected by this relief, any change in the behaviour of this speci…c group of women is interpreted as the e¤ect of social interaction. The variable of interest is men's and women's average years of schooling and the analysis is conducted at the municipality level. They …nd a similar e¤ect for men and women and interpret it as evidence of social interaction. This could also capture other type of factors, or even an impact of the earthquake on the labour market or the economies of the municipalities concerned, which a¤ects men and women in the same way.
Overall the existing literature does not directly examine the issue we are analysing in this paper. Most existing studies are mainly concerned with the impact of veteran status on subsequent civilian earnings, while we are primarily analysing the impact of the abolition of compulsory national service on the educational choice, which is made before the national service. A slightly di¤erent option is service in the police or civil security forces (10 months). There exists the additional option of civil forms of national service, i.e. forms designed to meet needs other than the defense or police ones (10 months). Other possibilities include service overseas and technical assistance services (16 months). These types of national service typically involve teaching or doing research in institutions which are dependent of the ministry of defense. Finally, there is a special form of the national service for the conscientious objectors (20 months).
The French government de…nes every year the number of positions as well as the skills required for the young people to be incorporated in the services of the national police (or civil security) force or in overseas services and scienti…c assistance services. Generally speaking, a university degree is required (i.e., four years of college or more) for overseas or scienti…c services.
All French men have the right of deferment of the national service until the age of 22 without any speci…c justi…cation. After the age of 22 and up to the age of 26, they need to be pursuing their studies in order to obtain additional deferment. Otherwise they are exposed to being called by the military administration. Individuals employed under an inde…nite term contract (or under a …xed-term contract of more than six months) can also bene…t from a two years deferment. If an individual has not been called by the age of 26 then he is exempted.
Other possible exemptions concern young people recognised as main wage earners in the family (i.e. those who have the responsibility of one or several persons who do not have su¢cient …nancial resources). Married men whose wives are without resources, those who are in charge of a small child also belong to this group. Those in charge of a family enterprise of agricultural, commercial or craft character, directors of an enterprise for at least the last two years and whose absence during the national service would cause serious problems for their employees may as well be exempted.
Another type of exemptions are exemptions for compensation. It concerns war orphans, men whose father, mother, sister or brother is declared as "dying for France", or died during a military action or an order of the public authority or public safety. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use the French Labour Force Surveys conducted each year from t = 1991 to t = 2002 by the French Statistical O¢ce. The sample is a representative sample of the French population age 15 or more (N = 150; 000; sampling rate=1=300). The survey provides information on the date of birth, sex and educational level of each respondent, as well s the occupation of their father. Also it provides information on the past (t ¡ 1) and present (t) activity status of each respondent, i.e., whether s/he is employed, unemployed, still on education, on the military service or without speci…c activity. Table 1 shows the proportion of male respondents doing the military service, by age group and birth cohorts. Comfortingly, the proportion is very close to zero for individuals whose It is possible to analyse the transitions between the di¤erent activity status using the available information on the past situation of individuals. Table 2 shows that only about 4% of the male respondents who were doing their military service at t-1 are on education at t. The vast majority of individuals do not go back to education after the military service. One year after the military service, most young men are in the labour market. A small fraction is still in the national service, plausibly those who are doing their service overseas or in technical assistance institutions. It should be noted that the transition rate from military service to labour market (or to education) is stable across cohorts.
We have also analysed the activity at t ¡ 1 of individuals who are doing their national service at t (not reported). We …nd that about two thirds were in education. Regarding the remaining third, about one third is unemployed, one third holds a temporary contract and one third a regular contract. These …gures con…rm that the vast majority were either in education or waiting for their call by the military administration with weak attachment to the labour market.
Theoretical Framework
Before the abolition of the military service, French students aged 18 had two basic options:
(1) military service …rst, and then entry into the labour market (option MW ), (2) additional education …rst, military service, and then entry into the labour market (option EMW ). In theory, they had two supplementary options: (3) military service …rst, additional education, and then entry into the labour market (option MEW), (4) entry into the labour market, then military service, and then re-entry into the labour market (W MW ). We observe only few such transitions in the data, however.
Students choose among these options by comparing their discounted values. For each student
) the discounted value of entering the labour market with (without) additional education. Using these notations, the discounted values of the di¤erent options may be written for student i,
where ± is the discount rate, w 0i the wages of i without education, c T the cost of entry into the labour market (i.e., the time and e¤ort spent to …nd a …rst job) while c E re ‡ects the cost of education and c S1 (c S2 ) the cost of doing the military service without (with) additional education. We can plausibly assume c S1 > c S2 1 .
Conditional on staying on in education, the trade-o¤ between education …rst (before the military service) and education after the military service is given by,
where ¢c S = c S1 ¡ ±c S2 is the cost of not postponing the military service. The fact that we do only observe very few transitions from military service to education (i.e. ,very few MEW ) may be interpreted as meaning that the discounted cost of not postponing the military service is actually larger than the cost of not postponing education (i.e., ¢c S > (1 ¡ ±)c E ): In the remainder, we assume that this condition holds true 2 .
Conditional on not pursuing education, the trade o¤ between military service …rst and military service after a …rst entry into the labour market is given by,
The fact that the vast majority of students choose to do their military service before entering the labour market may be interpreted as meaning that the transition cost c T is larger than the gains of postponing the military service. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this condition holds true.
Within this framework, the basic trade-o¤ is between pursuing education or not pursuing education before the military service and the entry into the labour market. We have,
where
represents the impact of education on discounted labour market outcomes. Two cases can be identi…ed:
If c E > ±u b i +¢c S then the cost of education is too high and the student chooses option MW . If c E < ±u b i + ¢c S then the cost of education is su¢ciently low (and the cost of not postponing military service su¢ciently high) for the student to choose education …rst (option EMW ).
After the reform (a), students have only two options: (1) direct entry into the labour market (W ) or (2) education …rst, and then entry into the labour market (EW ). The corresponding discounted values can be written
where L a 1i (L a 0i ) represents the discounted value of entering the labour market with (without) additional education after the reform. In such a case, the student chooses education if and only if the cost of education is smaller than the return to education, i.e. c E < u a i , where
represents the impact of education on discounted earnings after the reform. Before the reform, male (female) students stay on education if and only if u
After the reform, male and female stay on education if and only if u a i > c E : Hence, the reform may be interpreted as a positive shock to the cost of education
which has a¤ected male students only: Before the reform, some students are faced with relatively high cost of education compared to the returns (i.e., u b i < c E ), but choose nevertheless to stay on education in order to avoid the cost of not postponing the military service (i.e., c E > ±u b i + ¢c S ): After the reform, the cost of not postponing the military service disappears and these students may choose a direct entry into the labour market.
From an empirical point of view, our …rst purpose is to evaluate whether men's relative demand for education has actually declined after the reform, as predicted by the theory. Our second purpose is to use this speci…c exogenous shift in men's relative demand for education to identify the true impact of education on earnings.
Econometric Model-Results
Regarding the …rst step, the main issue is to separate the e¤ect of the reform ¢c E from the e¤ect of any variation in the return to education u a i ¡ u b i = ¢u that may have occurred during the period under consideration. Our identifying strategy relies on the fact that ¢c E a¤ects male only, while any variations in the return to education plausibly a¤ects male and female simultaneously.
Assuming that u a i may be written u b i +¢u and denoting F u (: j f ) the distribution function of u b i conditional on f 3 , the proportion of men (f = 0) who stay on in education before the reform is 1 ¡ F u (c E ¡ ¢c E j f = 0) while the proportion of men who stay in education after the reform is 1 ¡ F u (c E ¡ ¢u j f = 0): Similarly the proportion of women who stay in education before (after) the reform is 1 ¡ F u (c E j f = 1) (1¡ F u (c E ¡ ¢u j f = 1)): Within this framework, the variation in the probability of being on education for men may be written,
while the variation of being in education for women (f = 1) may be written,
The best case is clearly when we observe a non-negative shift in the demand of education for women and a negative shift for men. In such a case, we do not need to specify the distribution function of the individual returns to education u i to test whether ¢c E > 0 or not. Speci…cally, the non-negative shift for female may be interpreted as ¢u¸0 and the negative shift for male as ¢c E > ¢u¸0; which is what is needed.
6.1 Impact of the reform on educational outcomes before the ultimate decline of the national service induced by the reform and the cohort just after 3 f is a gender dummy, equal to 1 for females and equal to zero for men. the reform. The table con…rms that the proportion of men aged 18-22 who are still in education is signi…cantly less important (-3.8 percent points) for the generation born after the reform than for the two generations born before the reform. In contrast, we do not observe any signi…cant shift for men aged 16-17 or 23. Similarly, we do not observe any signi…cant changes for women.
These results suggest that a signi…cant fraction of the male population who left school before age 18 after the reform would have spent several additional years in the educational system in the absence of the reform. Table 4 con…rms the decline in men's relative probability of pursuing formal education after compulsory education. For each age group, it shows an OLS regression where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent is still in education and the independent variables a dummy indicating the sex of the respondent, a dummy indicating the date of birth and a dummy interacting sex and date of birth (its value is 1 for men born in 1979). The estimated coe¢cient of the interaction variable is negative and signi…cant at the 1% for the 18-22 age group. It is negative and marginally signi…cant for the 16-17 age group and close to zero and not signi…cant for the group of respondents aged 23.
From a theoretical point of view, the subgroup of the population a¤ected by the reform satis…es c E ¡ ¢c E < u b i < c E : before the reform, the students of this subgroup are faced with relatively high cost of education compared to the returns (i.e., u b i < c E ), but choose nevertheless to stay on education in order to avoid the additional cost of not postponing the military service (i.e., c E > c E ¡¢c E ): After the reform, the cost of not postponing the military service disappears and this subgroup of students choose a direct entry into the labour market. This subgroup of students are characterized by relative low returns to education and our data con…rm that they belong to the set of students who leave school before 20.
The reform has diminished men's probability of pursuing formal education after age 18 and the next question is whether this shift has in ‡uenced their relative academic credentials at the entry in the labour market. Table 5 focuses on the persons who were born in 1975-1976 and 1979 , who are observed in the labour market at t, who were in education or in military service at t¡ 1 and who were no more than 22 years' old during their last year of education (i.e., at t ¡1 if they were in education at that date, or at t ¡ 2 if they were in military service at t ¡ 1). The table provides an OLS analysis of three basic educational outcomes as a function of the sex, the date of birth (1975-1976 versus 1979 ) and a dummy interacting the date of birth and the sex (i.e.
indicating whether the observation corresponds to a man born after the reform). The outcomes under consideration are a dummy indicating whether the individual left school at age 18 or after, the number of years of schooling and a dummy indicating whether the individual has at least a vocational degree. The results con…rm a signi…cant decline in men's relative educational level after the reform.
Overall, the reform has not a¤ected men's relative probability of leaving school before age 23, but it has signi…cantly diminished men's relative number of years of education at the entry into the labour market and men's relative probability of having some degree (within the group of individuals who leave school before age 23). In other words the reform has more an impact on the timing of leaving education before the age of 23 rather than the probability of leaving before that age.
Impact on labour market outcomes
In this section, we provide an evaluation of the returns to education by comparing the di¤erences in labour market outcomes between men and women, before and after the reform. The reform may be interpreted as a positive shock to the cost of education for males. Thus we use this source of variation in the distribution of educational outcomes to identify the impact of education on labour market outcomes.
To achieve identi…cation, we assume that the wage of worker i at the entry in the labour market may be written,
where E i is a dummy indicating whether the worker has continued in any post compulsory formal education education, T i a dummy indicating whether he was born before or after the reform, f i a dummy indicating the sex of the worker and " i represents the unobserved characteristics of worker i. For now, we assume that the national service, as such, has no signi…cant e¤ect on wages 4 . We will provide simple tests of this assumption in the next section.
Using the same notation as in the previous section, the decision to pursue education is given by
where Z denotes the interaction between T i and f i :
Hence, we have,
Assuming that there exists a correlation between unobserved ability and unobserved returns (i.e., between´i and " i ); the true e¤ect of E i on ln w i (i.e., ®) cannot be identi…ed through standard OLS regression. In contrast, it can plausibly be identi…ed using Z as an instrumental variable. Given the reform and given our model of wages determination, Z a¤ects education and thus a¤ects earnings only insofar as it a¤ects education. Table 6 focuses on individuals born in 1975, 1976 or 1979, who are employed at t, who were still in education or military service at t ¡ 1 and who have left school before age 23. As shown above, the reform has not a¤ected the composition of this subgroup, but it has signi…cantly diminished the relative level of education of the men within this group. Given this fact, it is possible to evaluate the impact of education on earnings using the reform as an instrumental variable. The …rst column of the table shows the reduced form regression and con…rms that the decline in men's relative education has been accompanied by a signi…cant decline in their relative hourly wages at the entry into the labour market. Speci…cally, it reveals a 12% decline in the relative hourly wages of men after the reform (-12%). The second and third column show an OLS and an IV regression of (log) hourly wage on education, using the number of years of schooling as a measurement of education. The OLS regression reveals that every additional year of education increases hourly wages by 20%. The IV regression provides an estimate of the return to formal education which is signi…cant at standard level and about twice as large as the military service.
OLS estimate. It suggests that the true e¤ect of every additional year of education is a 38% increase in the entry hourly wage. The columns 4 and 5 replicate the analysis using a dummy indicating whether the individual left school after 18, as a measure of education. These results con…rm that the years after the end of compulsory schooling have a very signi…cant impact on hourly wage and that this impact is underestimated by OLS estimators. The same diagnosis holds true when we use a dummy indicating whether the respondent has some degree 5 as an independent variable (columns 6 and 7). The e¤ect is less precisely estimated, however.
With respect to both our OLS and IV estimates, it should be emphasized that the vast majority of young workers who enter the labour market with no formal quali…cations are hired under speci…c labour contracts (contrat de quali…cation, stage d'insertion, etc). In these cases, employers are assumed to provide on-the-job training and are allowed to pay wages which are much lower than the minimum wage. Speci…cally the entry wages paid to young workers under speci…c labour contracts vary across occupations and industries but can be as low as 25% of the minimum wage. In other words, French institutions do not bound the initial return to formal education to be small and it should not be a surprise to …nd that they are large. Our estimates are actually larger than what one typically …nds when one does not focus on new entrants.
When we compare older workers with and without formal education, the estimated returns to education are possibly biased by the fact that those without formal education have received more on-the-job training, at the beginning of their occupational career. By focusing on the new entrants, we are plausibly in a better position to identify the true e¤ect of formal education.
A comparison between our OLS and IV estimates reveals a downward bias in the former.
This suggests a negative correlation between men's education and the unobserved determinants of their wages. Men who enter the labour market without any degree receive wages which are on average higher than the wages that would have received individuals who pursue education if they had decided to enter the labour market without pursuing education.
Robustness check using the impact of the reform on the relative outcomes of sons of blue collar workers
The previous subsection implicitly assumes that the national service as such has no e¤ect on hourly wages. To test this assumption, we are going to use the fact that this reform has mostly a¤ected sons of blue collars. Table 7 focuses on cohorts born just before the reform and shows that that the proportion of sons of white collar workers doing their national service is signi…cantly smaller than the corresponding proportion of sons of blue collar workers, especially before age 22. In other words, inequalities in educational opportunities across sons of white and blue collar workers induced signi…cant inequalities in the probability of doing the national service: sons of white collar workers were about two times more likely to obtain deferments and exemptions than sons of blue collar workers. Given this fact, sons of white collar workers have plausibly been much less a¤ected by the reform than sons of blue collar workers. Table 8 shows the impact of the reform on the relative education of men, separately for children of white collar workers and those of blue collar workers. Most interestingly, it shows that the reform had a very strong impact on the relative education of sons of blue collar workers, but no no signi…cant impact on the relative education of sons of white collar workers.
This result provides a means to test whether the abolition of the national service, as such, has an e¤ect on entry wages. If this assumption was true, we should observe a shift in the relative entry wage of men within the group of children of white collar workers, even though their relative education has not changed, following the reform. Table 9 shows no such impact.
In contrast, the data con…rm the existence of a signi…cant decline in men's relative hourly wages within the group of children of blue collar workers (not reported here).
All in all, the reform a¤ected neither the relative education nor the relative entry wages of sons of white collar workers, while it a¤ected negatively both the relative education and relative entry wages of sons of blue collar workers. These results are consistent with the assumption that the national service a¤ected men's relative entry wages mostly through a¤ecting their relative education.
The fact that the reform a¤ected mostly sons of blue collar workers suggests an alternative strategy to identify the e¤ect of education on wages, i.e., by focusing on men and using the impact of the reform on relative education of sons of blue collar workers as a source of identi…cation. Table 10 con…rms that the reform had a signi…cant and negative impact on the relative education of sons of blue collar workers (column 1) and that this impact has been accompanied by a signi…cant and negative impact on their relative wages (column 2). The two last columns show the corresponding OLS and IV regressions. Comfortingly, the IV estimates obtained with this second strategy are close to those obtained with the …rst one.
Discussion
Generally speaking, our paper suggests that the returns to education are signi…cant and that the decision to pursue education is strongly dependent on credit constraints. One simple way to increase the demand for education is to provide …nancial help to young students from low socio-economic background families, typically by improving their access to the credit market.
It is di¢cult to be more speci…c without evaluating the cost c s of the military service. The conscripts received only some symbolical remuneration, but they were provided free medical care, food and accomodation. In 1996 the cost of these di¤erent provisions was about 40,000 FF per conscript, which was equivalent to half of the French minimum wage. Put di¤erently, the situation of a conscript can be thought of as roughly equivalent to that of someone in lowskill employment, but receiving only half of the corresponding wage. Hence, assuming that the conscripts did not su¤er from other costs than the missing wages, the costs of military service for each conscript was about half of the minimum wage, meaning about 6,000 euros. Within this framework, the possibility of defering the national service is equivalent to the possibility of obtaining a loan of 6,000 euros at age 18 in order to pursue education and our data suggest that such a possibility increased the proportion of young adult participating in post-18 education until age 22 by about 4 percent points. In France there exist already several types of …nancial help to young individuals who wish to continue their education. However, these are usually much smaller than the amount calculated above. In particular, allowances for secondary education (bourses du second degré) are provided to about 23% of the students in junior high-school, but only o¤er a maximum amount of 393 euros per year. Given our results, this seems much lower than the minimum amount that would be necessary to have a signi…cant e¤ect on education participation. Thus this …nancial help should be more important and more focused on youngsters from disadvantaged background.
Conclusion
Compulsory conscription in France was abolished in November 1997. The law de…ned that only men born until the end of 1978 would have to serve the army. Thus all Frenchmen born after 1979, did not do the national service.
From a theoretical point of view, the suspension of the military service has diminished men's incentive to continue education. Before the reform, staying on in education was actually a means to defer the national service and increase the probability of being exempted. As a matter of fact, we …nd that the reform has been followed by a signi…cant decline in the proportion of men in education at age 18-22, with no signi…cant change before 18 or after 22. We do not …nd any signi…cant change for women. Assuming that the reform has a¤ected men's relative wages at the entry into the labour market only through relative education, we use the interaction between a gender dummy and date of birth (after/ before 1979) as an instrumental variable to identify the e¤ect of various education outcomes (that is, years of schooling, the probability of having some degree and the probability of leaving education after 18) on entry wages. The IV estimates are positive and signi…cant and larger than the OLS estimates. The downward bias a¤ecting the OLS estimates suggests that young men entering the labour market without any degree have higher wages than those that would have received individuals who stay on in education, had they decided to enter the labour market without any further education. Additional investigations show that the reform had an impact mostly for children of blue collar workers. We use this variation across the two groups of men to provide an additional IV estimator for the returns to education. The results obtained with this second strategy are consistent with those obtained with the …rst one. Moreover given that the reform has not signi…cantly a¤ected education for the children of white collar workers, we provide a test for the existence of a direct impact of the national service on earnings by comparing the entry wages of men and women of this group, before and after the reform. As it turns out, we …nd no change in the relative wage of men within the group of children of white collar workers. The reform has a¤ected neither the relative education nor the relative wages of men within this group (while is has sharply a¤ected both relative education and relative wages withing the group of children of blue collar workers). These results are consistent with our assumption that the national service did not a¤ect earnings via channels other than education. Interpretation: The …rst column shows the result of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the respondent has at least a vocational degree and the independent variables are a dummy indicating the sex of the respondent, a dummy indicating whether s/he was born in 1979 and a dummy interacting the sex of the respondent and the birth cohort. We only report the estimated coe¢cient of the interaction variable. The dependent variable for column 2 (column 3) corresponds to a dummy indicating whether the respondent left school at 18 or more (the number of years of schooling). Interpretation: the …rst column shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage and the independent variables are dummy indicating the sex of the respondent, a dummy indicating whether s/he was born in 1979 and a dummy interacting the sex of the respondent and the birth cohort. Column 2 [4 (6)] shows the results of an OLS regression on the sex of the respondent, the dummy variable indicating whether s/he was born in 1979 and a variables on the years of schooling [a dummy for more that 17 years of schooling (a dummy indicating whether the respondent has some degree)]. Column 3 (5, 7) shows the results of an IV regression where the education variables have been instrumented by the dummy interacting the sex of the respondent and the birth cohort. Interpretation: The …rst column shows the result of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the respondent has at least a vocational degree and the independent variables are a dummy indicating the sex of the respondent, a dummy indicating whether s/he was born in 1979 and a dummy interacting the sex of the respondent and the birth cohort. We only report the estimated coe¢cient of the interaction variable. The dependent variable for column 2 (column 3) corresponds to a dummy indicating whether the respondent left school at 18 or more (the number of years of schooling). Panel A shows the results for the children of blue collar workers and panel B those for the children of white collar workers. Interpretation: this table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage and the independent variables are a dummy indicating the sex of the respondent, a dummy indicating whether s/he was born in 1979 and a dummy interacting the sex of the respondent and the birth cohort. The …rst column shows the results for the children of blue collar workers whereas column 2 shows those for the children of white collar workers. Interpretation: The …rst column shows the result of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of years of schooling and the independent variables are a dummy indicating whether the respondent is the son of a blue collar worker, a dummy indicating whether he was born in 1979 and a dummy interacting father's occupation dummy and the birth cohort. We only report the estimated coe¢cient of the interaction variable. The coe¢cient is signi…cant at standard level and negative which means that we observe a decline in blue collar workers' sons' relative educational level at the entry into the labour market. Column 2 shows the results of the reduced form equation where the dependent variable is the log hourly wage. The independent variables are the ones described above. The last two columns show the results from the OLS and IV estimation. In the IV estimation years of schooling have been instrumented by the interaction between the father's occupation dummy and the birth cohort.
